Quantum transhumanist technologies and quantum transhumanism start to become mainstream inside the transhumanist movement, with technologies, concepts and ideas that still might take several decades for be done in practice

This is a satirical website. Don't take it Seriously. It's a joke.

2059 57168 Shares

I also believe that the main reasons for this phenomenon are:

Quantum transhumanism is still just at its beginning. We haven’t got a proper scientific theory, framework and practice to work with. It is really hard to predict when something will come.

Quantum transhumanism is quite new. We just got this discipline about 20 years ago and it has not been well known outside the transhumanist community so far. The transhumanist movement has a lot of “mainstreaming” to do before quantum technologies and transhumanism will find their way to the masses, and they don’t like to talk about this, because they believe it might create a schism within their own community.

Transhumanism has been criticized and misunderstood quite a lot. Because of this, it is not so easy to get support for a new idea, and it is really hard to convince people to switch their views on this topic, and even more, to believe it’s true. I believe this is one of the most important reasons for the relative stagnation in the transhumanist community, and why it might take a few more decades to get something really interesting going on in the field.

It’s the job of the quantum transhumanist community to make a scientific case for quantum transhumanism. The problem is that we haven’t got any scientific theory or framework we could use to do that, and it’s really hard to predict what theories and frameworks will come in the future.

It also seems that the main problem is that there is not enough collaboration between different fields and disciplines to make things work. We also need some sort of quantum transhumanism network to coordinate our efforts, but it’s hard to get something going with a big set of people.

The problem is that the mainstream transhumanist movement got it wrong. They got the impression that the science of biology and chemistry will lead to the science of engineering, and thought that the time is now to focus on the problems of science and engineering.

But it seems that this is a wrong assumption, and might turn out to be another dead-end. Even though we are on the verge of the discovery of many things in science, it might be that there is just not enough new data yet, and that more is needed. We need a theory to base our thinking on, and the only scientific theory available at the moment is, in my view, the new theory of quantum mechanics.

So we need to take this as our starting point, and think about what to do about it, and about all the practical implications of quantum technology. We need to define a new field, the field of quantum transhumanism, and to learn how to work with the new ideas. The current transhumanist communities might not have all the tools and ideas we need for this, and it might be that some of the people in the new community need to be found in the old communities.

In this post I’ll first try to explain the idea of quantum transhumanism. I’ll then explain how I arrived at the idea, and finally talk about the new approach to science and technology that it implies.

A Brief Survey of the Basics

One of the strange features of quantum physics is that the world does not seem to have an ontological status. Quantum objects do not seem to exist in the way we normally think of things existing, and yet they seem to influence the way in which our world is. These two features of quantum theory are related: the objects don’t exist, but the way in which they are influenced by the things in the universe gives them ontological status.

What we call quantum physics is a theory about objects existing in the world, but they don’t seem to have a physical location in our usual way of thinking about them. Their ontological status, however, is clearly distinct from that of an ordinary object. One of the main differences is that quantum objects are not observable by our measuring apparatus. In fact, in quantum theory, the act of observation itself causes the phenomena we think of as the effects of observing.

Quantum physics is also concerned with the process of measuring. Our act of observing, we believe, changes the state of the quantum object we are observing. What this change really means is that the act of observation changes the probability that we will get the result we are expecting, according to our experience.

To understand quantum effects, we need to do more than just talk about observing. We need to talk about measuring. That’s because, when we talk about the state of a quantum system, we are really talking about probabilities. Quantum probabilities are not probabilities in the sense that they are attached to specific events. They are probabilities attached to a set of possible results. They are probabilities that relate to the probability of any particular outcome occurring if the experiment is repeated many times.

There is an assumption in most quantum theories, called the Born rule, which helps us to make sense of how quantum probabilities work. The Born rule says that the probability of a particular event occurring in a quantum system is equal to the square of the absolute value of the amplitude of that event. An amplitude is simply the square root of the probability for that event. The square root is a way of calculating probabilities. For example, when an electron has an amplitude of 0.005 for jumping off a metal surface, that means the electron has a 0.005 probability of jumping.

In general, when we have a system composed of two separate systems, the probability that we will see the result we expect is equal to the probability of observing one system multiplied by the probability of observing the other. If the probability of the first system is 0.05, and the probability of the second system is 0.01, then the probability of observing the first system and the second system is equal to the probability of observing the first system multiplied by the probability of observing the second system. If we write this out as a proportion, we get:

The total probability is equal to the product of the individual probabilities. The probability of the first system is always 0.05. The probability of the second system is always 0.01. So when we multiply, the probability of getting the result we see is always 0.1 (5 × 1). If the result we expect is not actually 0.1, but is 0.095 or 0.09, the proportion of results that are as we expect is (0.095) × (0.01), or 8.

What does this all have to do with the problem of consciousness? Our experience suggests that there is something it is like to be us. It feels as if we have a continuous consciousness which is somehow related to the conscious experience of other people. I have argued, based on the principle of biconditional implication, that you and I should have the same subjective experience in identical situations, that these two events are biconditionally implied. And I have also argued that we should, on the best explanation of why we experience things the way we do, have a consciousness that is continuous and somehow unified. This is supported by other facts: that we experience things as the same for ourselves, or differently for ourselves depending on what we are thinking or doing. Now, the fact that consciousness is continuous and unified means that we experience it as something like the consciousness of another person. We do not just experience ourselves as having a subjective consciousness. We experience other people as having the same kind of consciousness as we do. We cannot easily imagine another consciousness. We experience other people as having a subjective consciousness that is not only our own, but as having the same kind of subjective experience that we do. This is why it makes so little sense for us to attribute emotions or intentions to someone else who is not sharing our conscious experiences. We simply cannot do it. We do not feel like they have the same kind of consciousness as us. This is just one example. But it gives some indication as to the kind of consciousness we should have.

If you want to be really convincing, I suggest you use this kind of case in your argument: you go through the list of the possible emotions which an agent could have. If you can find one which an agent, in a situation like yours, should not have, then you have your point. Then, it is a matter of demonstrating that there is no possible situation in which an agent would have that emotion. It will not work, however, because every such emotion is conceivable. Even if you cannot find any emotion that I could not have, you might not be able to find one that I could not have. For example, in your argument about the suffering of babies, you could only show that it is conceivable that a baby could suffer. But, there is no point to my discussing the possibility of my being a baby, because I am not a baby. My point is simply that we cannot attribute emotions to someone we are not experiencing as having the same kind of consciousness as us. We do not experience them as having the same kind of consciousness as we do. The fact that such people are capable of suffering shows that they do not have the same kind of consciousness as we do. To prove that a person does not have the same kind of consciousness as we do is not sufficient, however. We have to go on to show that it is inconceivable that he could have the same kind of consciousness as we do.

It is, however, possible to think that a person could have experiences which are different from those he is having at the moment, and which are more fundamental.

This is a satirical website. Don't take it Seriously. It's a joke.